Editor:
I’m not sure which was more absurd: Deen Chatterjee’s article about whether it can be reasonable to believe in a god(s) (Feb. 3), or Adam Coon’s response (Feb. 4) to it.
Chatterjee made some good arguments that there is no reason to believe that there are any supernatural beings, comparing belief in such beings to belief in unicorns and dragons. He also correctly pointed out that while the latter are at least logically possible, the very concept of a supernatural being is utterly incoherent if one examines it closely and honestly.
However, he confused issues with several major errors. First of all, he seriously equivocated on the terms “belief,” “knowledge,” and “fantasy.” How is one supposed to “believe” in a god while at the same time “knowing” that no such thing actually exists? Chatterjee introduces a vague, confusing notion of “fantasy” in order to reconcile the apparent conflict, but of course no such reconciliation can be made: if one knows that god does not exist, one certainly does not believe in him, period.
Worse, Chatterjee seems to concede to the dogmatic believers against whom he’s arguing that were the concept of god not logically impossible, one could not dismiss it, by saying that we should acknowledge the possibility of the existence of such things as dragons and unicorns. But the fact is, just because one can’t disprove something, does not count as positive evidence for the possibility of its existence. Nor does the fact that someone can imagine such a thing. By the proper use of logic, the onus of proof rests on the party making a positive claim. Thus, if those arguing that god exists can’t produce a single piece of valid evidence to that effect, then there is absolutely no reason to believe that god does or even might exist. The claim is completely arbitrary, and therefore semantically empty–i.e., nonsense. (And they can’t provide any good evidence–the arguments popularly relied upon that if anything exists or has some kind of order to it then it must have been created by some all-powerful being are ridiculously fallacious.)
Which brings me to Coon’s letter.
He perfectly illustrates the absurdity of the believers’ position when he acknowledges the possibility of the existence of dragons and unicorns. He then adds that he doesn’t believe that they do, but the joke is on him: the concept of god is on precisely the same shaky grounds as those others that he dismisses. They are all arbitrary, or utterly lacking in positive evidence. So if he’s willing to believe in one, why not the other? Or more appropriately: if not one, why the other?
To close, Chatterjee poses the question: “If kids can have their Santa Claus, why can’t adults have their God?” The answer to that is, for the same reason that adults should no longer believe in Santa Claus. There is no difference between the two. There is no god, and there can never be a good reason to undercut one’s own mind by believing in something that doesn’t (and can’t) exist.
Andrew “Ash” VidrineObjectivist Club presidentSenior, [email protected]
